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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the before and after tax distribution of family
utility is used to measure the "true" progressivity of the personal
income tax. We suggest that the distribution of money income is a less
useful standard for assessing vertical tax equity than is the distribu-
tion of utility. An index of household utility is derived indirectly
from household labor supply behavior and before- and after-tax Lorenz
curves are calculated. A measure of the effective progression of the
income tax is then used to compare progressivity under the utility
standard with progressivity under a money income standard. We find
that the income tax is less progressive under the utility standard than
under the income standard.
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PROGRESS IV ITY OF THE INCOME TAX
Judging the vertical equity of a tax system demands a measure of
economic welfare. Traditionally, taxable income has provided that
standard. However, as many authors have noted, taxable income is an
inadequate measure of economic welfare since it does not account for
the nonmarket activities of the household. Activities such as
cooking, car maintenance, volunteer work, and leisure improve economic
well-being but do not contribute to taxable income. Consequently,
measures of tax progressivity based on taxable income are distorted.
Becker (1965) and Musgrave (1976) have suggested that instead of
taxable money income, full income be used to measure economic well-
being. Full income is the total income of the household when all
family members work the full time available. It can be calculated by
multiplying the time available to each family member by the respective
wage and adding the unearned income of the family. Since full income
depends only on time available and not on the allocation of time bet-
ween market and nonmarket activities, it provides a more comprehensive
measure of economic well-being than does money income. The disadvan-
tage of full income as a measure of economic welfare is that it does
not discriminate between increases in full income due to better wage
opportunities and those due to increases in unearned income even though
the latter contribute more to increasing well-being than do the former.
This last point is illustrated in Figure 1 showing the choice
between income and leisure. The original budget constraint is ABC, and
full income is OA. An increase in full income to OA' can come about in
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Figure 1 Income-Leisure Choice
Income
Leisure
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two ways: by an improvement in wage opportunities (shifting the budget
constraint to A'BC) or by an increase in nonwork income (shifting the
budget constraint to A'DC). As seen in the figure, the consumer is made
better off (i.e., is moved to a higher indifference curve) by the in-
crease in nonwork income than by the increase in wage opportunities.
We submit that a better measure of economic welfare than either
taxable income or full income is the utility level of the household.
Since utility is a function of taxable income and the quantity of
leisure consumed, it reflects both market and nonmarket uses of time.
It also has an advantage over full income in that the utility level is
sensitive to increases in income due to improved wage opportunities and
those due to increased nonwork income. In Figure 1, the utility level
is clearly higher after the increase in nonwork income than after the
improvement in wage opportunities even though the level of full income
is identical under the two circumstances.
In this study, economic welfare is approximated by a measure of
household utility derived indirectly from household labor supply beha-
vior. First, work offer curves for the family are estimated to obtain
estimates of the parameters of the household utility function. The
parameters of the utility function are then used to calculate a welfare
index for each household. Households are next ranked according to
their utility levels before and after tax so that before- and after-tax
Gini coefficients can be calculated. The Gini coefficients are used to
compare tax progressivity using the utility standard with tax progres-
sivity using the taxable income standard. According to our measure,
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the income tax is progressive by both standards, but less progressive
under the utility standard than under the income standard.
In Section I, our methodology for estimating household utility
levels is explained and in Section II, the data used in the study are
described. Section III contains the results of estimating household
utility levels, while section IV presents the results on tax progressi-
vity. Section V is the conclusion.
I. Methodology
It is assumed that household utility is Cobb-Douglas in after-tax
income, leisure of the husband, and leisure of the wife:
(1) U = a i lnYd
+ a
2
lnL, + a
3
lnL
2
where Y is household disposable income, L. and L» are the leisure
hours of the husband and wife, and the a's are positive constants that
sum to one. In its maximization of utility, the household is con-
strained by an income and a time constraint. According to the income
constraint, family income must be equal to the sum of the husband's and
wife's earnings and the nonwork income of the family minus the family
tax liability:
(2) Y . = Y - T(Y-e) = w.H, + w H + I - T(Y-e)
a l l z z
where Y is family income before tax, T(Y-e) is the family income tax
liability, e is total exemptions and deductions, w is the hourly wage,
H is hours of work, I is nonwork income, and the subscripts denote the
husband and wife, respectively. The family time constraint limits
hours of work and hours of leisure to the total time available:
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(3) K = H. + L. j = 1, 2
3 3
where K is the fixed amount of time available.
The income tax is a bracket tax on family taxable income, Y-e. For
a family in the ith tax bracket, the tax function is given by:
(4) T = B. + t. (Y-e-b.
)
11 l
where t. is the ith bracket tax rate, b. is the minimum income in that
l l
tax bracket, and B. is the tax payable on that minimum income. For
example, under current law, a taxpaying family in the 40 percent
bracket filing jointly pays tax equal to $10,334 (B) plus .40 (t) times
taxable income in excess of $45,800 (b).
Maximization of household utility (1) subject to the income and
time constraints yields the following work offer curves for the husband
and wife:
ft \ « m w r Ul-t) + t(e+b) - B 1 v
w
2(5a) H = (l-a )t<. - a.J jr. > J - a„K
—
1 2 2 w. (1-t) 2 w
(^\ u n \v r Kl-t) + t(e+b) - B 1 V
W
2(5b) h - (l-a,;K - a„ L r~, ^s - a~K
2 3 3 w,
;
(1-t) 3 w„
which relate hours of work to the own wage, the spouse's wage, nonwork
income, and the parameters of the tax system.
Since H. = K - L
.
, we can then substitute (5a) and (5b) back into
the utility function (1). Simplifying yields:
(6) V = ln[w
1
(l-t)K + w
?
(l-t)K + I(l-t) + te + tb - B]
- a ? lnw (1-t) - a^lnw ? (l-t) + a,lna, + a? lna ? + a-,lna.
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which is the indirect utility function of the household. Note that
the first argument of V is full income but that V is also a function of
the wage rates of the husband and wife after tax and the parameters of
the utility function. Estimates of a,, a„
,
and a- obtained by esti-
mating (5a) and (5b) using restricted least squares allow us to calcu-
late V for each household in our sample. A description of the sample
data follows in the next section.
II. Data
The sample of husband-wife families used in this study was drawn
from the 1980 Michigan Survey of Income Dynamics. The data set con-
tains information on income, wage, hours of work, and family
demographic characteristics as well as tax information on total tax
liability and marginal tax rate. A subset of 1,972 husband-wife fami-
lies formed the basis for our study. Families on welfare, families in
which the husband was less than 18 or more than 65 years of age, and
families with negative nonwork income were excluded from the sample
because we felt that behavior of these families would not be well
described by the work-leisure choice model of our study.
Since, in the case of some families the wife was not employed and
therefore had no observed wage, and since the wage is measured with
error for wives who were employed, we used the Heckman (1980) method to
obtain a consistent estimate of the potential wages of wives in our
sample. Using the Heckman method, we first estimated (using probit
analysis) the probability that a wife worked outside the home. Second,
we estimated a wage equation through regression analysis, using the
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paranieters of Che probit estimation to adjust for bias in the estima-
tion of the wage. The wage equation was then used to impute a wage to
all wives in the sample.
The data contained information on the family's marginal tax rate,
t, and total income tax liability, T. This information was used to
infer the other tax parameters by solving for the unknown tax parame-
ters in equation (4). This gave us:
(7) t(e+b) - S = tY - T
which we calculated for each household in the sample. In estimating
our model it was assumed that the tax brackets are sufficiently wide
that small changes in income do not cause changes in tax brackets.
This allowed us to disregard nonlinearities in the tax function and use
3
ordinary least squares to estimate our model.
Measurement of the other variables in the study was straightforward,
Hours of work were measured annually, the husband's wage was computed
by dividing earnings by hours worked, and nonwork income was computed
by subtracting the earned income of the husband and wife from total
family income. Estimates of the wage equations for black and nonblack
wives appear in Table 1. The columns headed LFP give the results of
the probit estimation of the probability that the wife participates
in the labor force. The wage equation shows that city size has a posi-
tive influence on the wife's wage while the wage increases with years
worked but at a decreasing rate. The education level of the wife was
entered as a series of dummy variables with 17 or more years the
omitted category. The negative coefficients indicate that those with
Table 1
Estimates of the Wage Equations for Black and Nonblack Wives
(t ratios in parentheses)
Explanatory Nonbl;ick Black
Variables LFP Wage LFP Wage
Constant 2.821 8.585 3.684 7.159
(10.221) (13.540) (5.218) (6.465)
Nonwage income -.484E-5
(-1.254)
—
-.978E-5
(-.674)
—
City size -.0416 1.049 -.121 1.150
(-.559) (5.085) (-.761) (3.934)
Education
0-5 years -.747 -8.049 .718 -5.884
6-9 years -.748 -6.156 -.509 -5.360
10 years -.703 -5.186 -.625 -4.932
11 years -.276 -4.843 -.727 -6.521
12-13 years -.474 -4.935 -.542 -4.321
14 years -.165 -3.887 -.356 -3.627
15 years -.284 -3.285 -1.914 -5.551
16 years -.118 -2.762 .492 -2.573
Years worked .896 .133 .124 .065
(5.149) (3.043) (3.875) (1.061)
Years worked -.000983 -.00215 -.00298 -.00173
squared (-1.649) (-1.448) (-1.983) (-0.852)
Husband's wage -.0182
(-3.520)
—
-.00582
(-.589)
—
Children
1-2 years -.705 — -.482 —
3-5 years -.499 — -.203 —
6-13 years -.140 — -.109 —
—
Age -.0577
(11.448)
—
-.0858
(-6.550)
—
Home ownership .178
(1.785)
.259
(1.608)
Probit Lambda — -.191
(-.730)
—
.459
(1.198)
R ."205 .208
-2 times log
likelihood ratio 295.89 96.62
Sample size 1507 1014 465 353
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less than 17 years of education earn a lower wage and that generally,
the lower the education level, the lower the wage.
III. Estimation Results
After the wage function was used to impute a wage to each woman in
the sample, the work offer curves were estimated using restricted least
squares. The results of the estimation are in Table 2. The estimates
of the utility function parameters are all between zero and one as
required by theory.
Table 3 shows the utility parameters implied by the regression
coefficients for the four population subgroups. The parameter a.,
reflects the family's utility weight on income and the estimate shows
it to be higher for those with more than 12 years of school. This is
an expected result if families view education as an investment in
higher future income. The parameters a„ and a^ are the family utility
weights on the husband's and the wife's leisure, respectively. For
nonblacks, our estimates show little difference in these weights bet-
ween husbands and wives although black families place a higher weight
on the husband's than on the wife's leisure according to our estimates.
The utility level was calculated on the basis of the estimated weights
for each of the four subgroups and is shown in the table. Since the
utility level has only a relative significance, it is shown as a ratio
to the population mean utility level. The group with the highest util-
ity level is nonblacks with more than 12 years of education while the
group with the lowest utility level is blacks with less than 12 years
of education.
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Table 2
Estimates of the Work Offer Curves
Nonblack Black
Slope Slope R
Education < 12
Husbands
Wives
Education > 12
Husbands
Wives
-.249
(-40.71)
-.241
(-58.48)
-.224
(-31.27)
-.224
(-51.26)
.b69
.806
.588
.793
-.387
(-64.04)
-.184
(-25.64)
-.384
(-34.55)
-.141
(-10.71)
,918
,644
,923
537
All
Husbands
Wives
-.237
(-50.68)
-.233
(-77.49)
.630
.799
-.387
(-72.80)
-.172
(-27.16)
.919
.61^
—2 2
Notes: R is adjusted R . Numbers in parentheses are t-ratios
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Table 3
Utility Parameters by Type of Family
Utility bample
Group a.. a„ a . '
1 2 3 level size
Nonblack, Education < 12 .510 .249 .241 .971 822
Nonblack, Educatioa > 12 .522 .224 .224 1.199 685
Black, Education < 12 .429 .387 .184 .727 365
Black, Education > 12 .474 .385 .141 .866 100
All .525 .260 .215 1.000 1972
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IV. Measuring Tax Progressivity
A measure of tax progressivity developed by Musgrave and Thin (M-T)
(194a) is used to compare the progressivity of the income tax under a
utility standard with its progressivity under a taxable income stan-
dard. The M-T measure is based on the coefficient of equality defined
as one minus the Gini coefficient. If E is the after-tax coefficient
a
of equality and E, the before-tax coefficient of equality, then M-T
measures the effective progression of a tax by the ratio E /E, . If
a b
the ratio is equal to one, the tax is proportional; if it is greater
than one, the tax is progressive; and if it is less than one, the tax
is regressive. Hence, the effective progression of the income tax
depends on the extent to which it shifts the distribution of income
toward equality.
The Musgrave-Thin measure of effective progression is illustrated
in Figure 2. The coefficient of equality before tax is the ratio of
the area beneath the before-tax Lorenz curve and the area under the
line of equality. The after-tax coefficient of equality is measured
similarly with respect to the after-tax Lorenz curve. If the after tax
Lorenz curve lies wholly to the left of the before-tax Lorenz curve (as
it does in the diagram), the tax is progressive. Conversely, the tax
is regressive if the after-tax Lorenz curve lies wholly to the right of
the before-tax Lorenz curve. Using 1948 data, Musgrave and Thin found
the coefficient of equality for the distribution of income before tax
was .853, the coefficient of equality after tax was .872, implying a
4
coefficient of progression of 1.022.
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Figure 2
Before- and After-Tax Lorenz Curves
Cumulative
% of
Income
Cumulative % of
Households
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In order to compute the M-T measure of progressivity , the house-
holds in our sample were ranked by their income and utility levels.
The population was divided into deciles and the proportion of income
and utility attributable to each decile was computed. These calcula-
tions were made before and after tax. The results are shown in Table 4,
The Gini coefficient and the coefficient of equality are shown in
the last two lines of the table. The Gini coefficient was calculated
using the trapezoidal method which assumes that the Lorenz curve can be
approximated by a series of linear relationships. The coefficient of
equality is simply one minus the Gini coefficient. The larger the
coefficient of equality and the smaller the Gini coefficient, the more
equal is the distribution. As seen in the table, utility is more
equally distributed than is income and taxes tend to equalize both the
distribution of income and the distribution of utility.
In order to measure the progression of the income tax with respect
to income and utility, we use the Musgrave-Thin measure of effective
progression, E /E . With respect to income, effective progression of
3. D
the income tax is 1.041 while with respect to utility, effective
progression is 1.033. Since effective progression is greater than one
in both cases, the income tax is progressive by this measure; however,
the effective progression of the tax is greater with respect to income
than with respect to utility. Compared with the Musgrave-Thin measure
of effective progression in 1948 of 1.022, both our measures show the
income tax to have greater progressivity 32 years later (19&0).
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Table 4
Distribution of Pre- and Post-Tax Income
and Utility for Families, 1980
% Share of Total % Share of Total
Income (Utility) Income Util.ity
Decile
Before Tax After Tax Before Tax After Tax
Bottom decile 3.4 3.8 6.0 6.5
2nd decile 5.3 5.7 6.9 7.4
3rd decile 6.4 6.9 7.6 8.0
4th decile 7.4 7.8 8.3 8.6
5th decile 8.4 8.7 9.0 9.2
bth decile 9.4 9.6 9.7 9.8
7th decile L0.6 10.6 10.4 10.4
8th decile 12.1 12.0 11.2 11.1
9th decile 14.3 14.1 12.4 12.1
Top decile 22.7 20.7 18.2 16.8
Gini coefficient .276 .24b .174 .147
Coefficient of .724 .754 .826 .853
equality
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V. Conclusion
In this paper, the before- and after-tax distributions of family
utility are used to measure the "true" progressivity of the personal
income tax. We find that while utility is more equally distributed
than taxable income, the personal income tax is actually less progres-
sive by the utility standard than by the taxable income standard.
From a practical point of view, basing the personal income tax on
household utility levels is infeasible. The estimate of the utility
level depends on the choice of utility function. In this study, we
selected the Cobb-Douglas utility function because of its conveniently
linear offer curves. An unfortunate feature of this utility function,
however, is that it restricts the elasticity of substitution between
income and leisure to one. Relaxing this assumption requires more com-
plicated estimation techniques. The gain in terms of getting a better
measure of utility must be weighed against the loss in estimation effi-
ciency.
Admitting that our measure of household utility is imperfect, we
nonetheless maintain that it provides a better picture of income tax
progressivity than does taxable income. While there can be no scien-
tific resolution to the debate on how progressive should be the income
tax, rational political decision-making depends on a realistic measure
of tax progressivity. The distribution of household utility provides
that measure and provides further evidence that the income tax may be
less progressive than has been previously believed.
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Footnotes
13oadway and Wildasin (1984), pp. 265-266.
See Varian (1978, p. 94) for the derivation of the indirect uti-
lity function in the one-person Cobb-Douglas case.
3
This approach was followed successfully by Wales and Woodland
(1977).
4
Musgrave and Thin (1948), p. 511.
Since the before- and after-tax Lorenz curves do not cross, the
Gini coefficient is an appropriate means for comparing income inequali-
ty. Atkinson (1970) showed that the Gini coefficient can be misleading
if Lorenz curves intersect.
See Blum and Kalven (1953) for an interesting discussion of the
pros and cons of progressive taxation.
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